Eighty-eight female subjects were assigned to dyads homogeneously composed with regard to their valuation of risk acceptance (low or high) as well as their need for approval (Iow or high). The dyads discussed each of a set of hypothetical decision situations involving risk taking and, at the end of each discussion l indicated the risk levels acceptable for them. High-value dyads shifted significantly more toward risk, relative to their prior decisions (2 X 2 analysis of variance). As intended, the study demonstrates that risk as a value plays a causal role in the group risky-shift effect. Other results are brought to bear on the parsimony of recent formulations of the value theory of risky shift.
"Value theory" explains the group riskyshift phenomenon as a consequence of the positive value typically placed on risk acceptance, in conjunction with group discussion as a vehicle for attaining the value (Brown, 1965) .3 Levinger and Schneider (1969) have shown the first supposition-that risk is a value-to be true. When asked about the level of risk acceptance that they considered as most admirable, college students indicated higher levels of risk than they had accepted in their own previous decisions. (It was anticipated that the same would be found in the present study.) Additional support comes from a study by Madaras and Bern (1968) , who found more positive evaluations (ratings) being made of risk-accepting than of cautious stimulus persons.
Even with the evidence just noted, it remains to be demonstrated that the positive value of risk acceptance is a causal factor 1 This research is part of the program of the Research Center for Social and Economic Psychology (Sonderforschungsbereich) at the University of Mannheim and was financed by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. 2 Requests for reprints should be sent to Helmut Lamm l Institut fur Sozialwissenschaften, Universitat Mannheim, 68 Mannheim, West Germany.
3 No consideration will be given here to the reported finding of cautious shifts on a few items (hypothetical decision situations) of the kind used in the present study as a measure of risk taking. Just as it can be argued that value theory is able to account for shifts toward lower risk levels, so the argument of the present study can be applied, hy appropriate inversion, to the (less general) phenomenon of a group shift toward caution.
under lying the group risky-shift effect. The present study is intended to establish this causality by showing that groups of subjects placing high value on risk acceptance manifest larger risky shifts than groups characterized by lower valuation of risk.
Just as the existence of the nexus between the value of risk and the shift toward risk has not been empirically established, so its nature -the social-motivational process bringing about the risky-shift outcome-has not been investigated concJusively. A formulation that is attractive by its applicability beyond the risk-taking domain has been proposed by Levinger and Schneider (1969) , who found that subjects typically consider themselves as more willing th~n their peers to accept risk. This finding has been reported in other recent studies (Ferguson & Vidmar, 1970; Stoner, 1968; Wallach & Wing, 1968) , and the present study was designed to confirm it with German subjects. As Levinger and Schneider (1969) suggested, discussion provides a new (more risky) reference point to group members, who are thus "freed to make a new compromise between their ideal and the newly perceived point of reference, and their choices can shift closer to their ideal [po 168] ." That the reference point (estimate of peers' risk acceptance) indeed changes toward higher risk levels as a result of discussion has been shown by Ferguson and Vidmar (1970) .
Two questions may be raised in regard to the above considerations. First, is the shift in reference point-the "eye-opener" effect-essential to the validity of the value theory?
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First publ. in: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 20 (1971), 3, pp. 430-435 Konstanzer Second, what motivations underlie the desire, acted out through group discussion, to move closer toward ideal positions (higher risk levels)? Conceivably, the approximate attainment of ideal standards serves a need for social recognition or approval. explore this possibility, the present study investigates the role of subjects' needs for social approval. According to Crowne and Mar lowe ( 1964) , "the studies of the approval motive suggest a set of self-reflexive attitudes-a self conception-in which an idealized version of the self ... is maintained and defended [po 190 ] ." may be hypothesized that groups of subjects characterized by high approval needs, compared to groups with low approval needs, would shift more markedly toward higher risk acceptance, because they would thereby move toward more highly regarded positions! Confirmatory results on this hypothesis would suggest that one motivational factor involved in the group shift mechanism is the desire for esteem. The inclusion of need for approval as an experimental variable was frankly exploratory, particularly view of its complexity as a personality construct (see Crowne Marlowe, 1964, p. 201) and in view of Kogan and Wallach's (1967) finding of a negative association between need for approval and risky shift .09).
4 here~but gard), believe the ideal preferences of their peers to he in the same-more risky-direction. This assumption easy to test. To have pertinent data collected from the subjects of the present experiment would have made them possibly too sensitive to the purposes of the study.
METHOD

Subjects
One hundred and fifty-five female students at the University of Mannheim (Germany) volunteered to participate. On the basis of the preexperimental take part in the experiment proper, for which they
Risk-Taking Instrument
The choice-dilemmas task (Kogan Wallach, 1964, translated and adapted to fit the German cultural context (see Lamm & Kogan, 1970) . Each item risk taking is indicated by the minimum odds of from a 10% to a 100% chance that the risky al- For each of the risky alternative. They were then asked be given by the majority of German students of of their peers. (c) Finally, they were asked to go through the items a last time and indicate the decisions for which they had the highest regard ("Ihre hochste Anerkennung finden wiirde").5
Preexperimental Session
be less applicable to a cautious decision than would Schneider (1969). Further, a significant negative correlation was found between peer-minus-own and ownminus-ideal decisions (r = -.34, P < .01),
indicating that the more the subject assumes she is riskier than her peers, the smaller the distance she indicates between her own actual and her ideal decisions. In other words, the more the subject thinks she excels her peers in risk acceptance, the more she considers herself as being in line with her ideal. (It may be of interest to note that this correlation did not approach significance when computed on total choice-dilemmas scores.) None of the correlations between need for approval and the variables mentioned above (based on total choice-dilemmas scores) approached significance.
Results Involving Risky Shift
As is shown in Tables 2 and 3 , subjects characterized by a higher value of risk (higher discrepancy between own and ideal, more risky decisions) manifested larger risky shifts after dyadic discussion than those in the low value category (F = 4.46, P < .05), confirming the principal experimental hypothesis.
With the exception of the low-value, highneed-approval condition, the risky shifts were significant for the various dyadic types (p < .05 or better; see Table 2 ).
In addition to the analyses presented in Tables 2 and 3 , correlations were performed between the own-peer discrepancy score and risky shift. The correlation was not significant when based on total choice-dilemmas scores. But when performed on each of the items, the 10 coefficients yield an average r of -.31 (p < .01, after appropriate z transformations). In other words, the more pronounced the tendency to see oneself as riskier than the peer group, the smaller the shift toward higher risk levels. This result, surprising at first glance in its apparent contradiction to the value-theory prediction, becomes more plausible when one considers, on the one hand, the positive correlation (r = . 32, df=86, p<.Ol) between own predyadic decisions and risky shift (i.e., more cautious subjects shifted more markedly) and, on the other hand, the negative correlation (r = -.39, df = 86, P < .01) between own predyadic decisions and relative underestimation of peers' risk acceptance (i.e., the more cautious subjects were less likely to believe their peers to be more cautious than themselves). When own predyadic decisions are partialed out, the resulting partial correlation between relative underestimation of peers' risk acceptance and risky shift becomes negligible. When based on dyadic scores (N = 44), the correlation is negligible even without partialing out subjects' own predyadic decisions. The above correlational patterns are the same (though at lower levels of significance) for each of the four experimental conditions (22 subjects in each case).
DISCUSSION
The finding of Levinger and Schneider (1969 ) -that subjects think they accept more risk than their peers and that, on the other hand, they accept less risk than they consider ideal-is replicated here with German subjects, thus confirming the validity of the central and a subsidiary assumption contained in the value theory of the risky-shift phenomenon.
More important, the present study provides .a direct and successful test of the proposition that the risky-shift effect is indeed a function of risk as a value. 6 This causal relation has lleretofore not been empirically demonstrated.
No evidence was found concerning any effect on risky shift of the subjects' underestimation of their peers' (relative to their own) risk acceptance. However, with mere two-person groups, the present experiment may have provided a rather inefficient design for uncovering any effect of the peer-estimation factor: it is doubtful that a single peer-group member's display of higher than expected risk acceptance has sufficient impact to change one's reference point in the risky direction. It may be concluded, then, that the present design has been too weak to allow the socialcomparison factor (peer estimation) of the value theory to come into play. Stronger experimental procedures (larger sized groups and direct manipulation) are needed to investigate that factor as a possible contributor to the risky-shift effect. On the other hand-.and more important at this point-considering that the value of risk did have the predicted effect on risky shift in the present study, one is led to conclude that the socialcomparison component (underestimation of peers) is not necessary for value theory to be valid.
The approval motive had no effect on risky shift. In explanation, consider that the need for approval may motivate subjects to present themselves as in line with normal standards (see Crowne & Marlowe, 1964 , p. 202) as 6 Vidmar (1970 has shown that greater heterogeneity (discrepancy) among group members' initial choice-dilemmas decisions is associated with greater risky shift. To ascertain whether the present riskyshift differences were not caused by such differential heterogeneity, an approximative index of heterogeneity was obtained for each of the four sets of experimental dyads by computing, for each item, the standard deviation of own decisions over the respective 22 individuals. The low-and high-value -conditions did not differ on that index. The average (per item) standard deviations were 1.95, 2.01, 1.94, and 1.97 for the low-low, low-high, high-low, and high-high value and need-approval conditions, respectively.
well as with ideal standards of behavior (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964, p. 190; Pervin & LilIy, 1967) . In the present experimental situation, these two orientations may be seen as represented by the respective measures of peer-own and own-ideal position discrepancies. Obviously, the two tendencies here act in mutually opposite directions. Thus, if in the present study the subjects high, in comparison to those low, in need for approval strive more strongly to match ideal standards (higher risk levels), the effect is neutralized by their stronger concern over closeness to the presumed normal position (lower risk levels). If the latter consideration is valid, high approval needs should be associated with stronger shifts in sufficiently large groups, where group discussion demonstrably leads to the displacement of the perceived social standard toward higher risk (Ferguson & Vidmar, 1970) , thus "taking care" of subjects' concern over closeness to the normal position. Yet, Kogan and Wallach (1967) , using fiveperson female groups, found an indication of smaller shifts by groups of subjects high in need for approval. (These authors explained their finding through the affective inhibitions presumably characterizing persons with strong approval needs.)
Concerning the role of the approval motive, it may thus be concluded that the present study-together with Kogan and Wallach (1967)-casts doubt on the desire for social esteem as a possible motivational source underlying subjects' shift toward more aspired and risky stands. Rather, it appears to be self-esteem motivation that disposes subjects toward greater commitment to their aspired risk levels. The latter proposition is supported by a near-significant correlation (r = .25, df = 42, P < .10, two-tailed) between self-esteem and risky shift across the 44 experimental dyads. 1 (No other correlation with self-esteem approached significance.) The role of self-esteem in risky shift appears to be worth more focused investigation.
The implications of the present study may be summarized as follows: (a) It is demonstrated conclusively that the group risky-shift effect is attributable, at least in part, to the positive value of risk. The principal argument of value theory is thus confirmed by experimental evidence. (b) There is indirect evidence in the present study suggesting that the social-comparison aspect of value theory -the fact that subjects typically think they surpass their peers in risk acceptance-is less essential to the validity of value theory than has been widely assumed. (c) Tentative evidence suggests that shifting toward risk in a group discussion helps subjects sustain their self-esteem rather than gain social esteem. This is presumably because they are moving closer to a position which they personally value.
